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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In August 1988, the Secretary of Energy announced a strategy to acquire New Production Reactor 
capacity for producing tritium.  The strategy involved construction of a New Production Modular
High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (NP-MHTGR) where the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) was selected as the Management and Operations contractor 
for the project.  Immediately after the announcement in August 1988, tritium target particle 
development began with the INEEL selected as the lead laboratory.  Fuel particle development
was initially not considered to be on a critical path for the project, therefore, the fuel development 
program was to run concurrently with the design effort of the NP-MHTGR. 
During 1989, a fuel technology working group was formed which comprised members of the 
Department of Energy (DOE), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), General Atomics (GA), 
and the INEEL.  The working group identified technical uncertainties concerning the fuel that 
might jeopardize a favorable Record of Decision for the NP-MHTGR.  Based upon these
concerns, the NP-MHTGR Fuel Development Program was initiated in January 1990.  The 
program had the following objectives: 
x develop fuel fabrication processes that meet product and process specifications 
x demonstrate and qualify the fuel irradiation behavior under normal and accident conditions
x develop and refine predictive fuel performance and fission product behavior capabilities. 
Proof test fuel was manufactured by General Atomics and its subcontractor, Babcock & Wilcox 
on laboratory scale equipment.  The fuel particle configuration included four major changes from
previous U.S. gas reactor fuel designs. These changes were:
x the fuel kernel was UCO rather than UC2 or UO2
x a protective pyrolytic carbon (PPyC) layer was added to reduce mechanical damage of the 
fuel particles during compacting
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x the inner pyrolytic carbon (IPyC) layer was made thicker to protect the kernel from chemical 
attack during SiC application 
x seal coats were added to both sides of the PPyC layer and between the buffer and 
IPyC layers to prevent coating interactions.
This fuel met the fuel product specifications and had the best as-manufactured particle quality 
ever produced in the U.S. 
Three irradiation tests were conducted to demonstrate that the proof test fuel would meet the 
performance goals for the NP-MHTGR.  One test, designated NPR-1, was to demonstrate
maximum service life conditions for temperature, burnup, and fast neutron fluence.  The second
test, designated NPR-2, was conducted at a lower temperature which was to be more
representative of the core average temperature. These two tests were performed in the High Flux
Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at ORNL.  The third test, designated NPR-1A, was conducted as a 
backup test to NPR-1 and would increase the assurance that a bounding demonstration would be
completed.  This test was performed in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the INEEL.
Fuel performance models predicted no particle failures in each of the tests.  However, after 
reaching a burnup of 48 %FIMA, NPR-1A experienced its first particle failure.  Continued 
monitoring indicated about two additional particle failures each day until the irradiation was 
terminated after reaching 64 %FIMA, instead of its original goal of 75 %FIMA.  It was decided
to remove NPR-1A early to allow for the earliest possible assessment of the particle failures.  It
was estimated that a total of 48 particles had failed.  NPR-1 experienced its first particle failure at 
a burnup of 72 %FIMA and NPR-2 at 75 %FIMA. About 526 particles were estimated to have 
failed in NPR-1 and about 135 particles in NPR-2 after the fuel reached a burnup of 79 %FIMA
in each test.  In total, about 700 out of the 230,000 fuel particles contained in the three tests had
failed.
Shortly after the completion of the irradiation tests, DOE announced in September 1992 the
closeout of the NP-MHTGR program. Work continued through to September 1993 in areas of 
exploratory process development of NP-MHTGR fuel, characterization of the as-manufactured
proof test fuel, and postirradiation examination of the irradiated proof test fuel. 
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Evidence from the as-manufactured characterization, irradiation, and postirradiation examination
data indicated that irradiation-induced changes in the pyrocarbons played a dominant role in the
failure of the fuel particles.  It was expected that the PPyC layers would shrink and fail early in
the irradation.  Shrinkage was also expected in the OPyC, however, the extent of the OPyC
failure was unexpected and was most likely caused by crack propagation from the PPyC,
facilitated by the seal coat.  The observed widespread IPyC layer failures were most likely a 
result of irradiation-induced shrinkage. These failures placed large concentrations of tensile 
stress in the SiC layer adjacent to the IPyC crack tips.  Crack propagation through the SiC layer
was then the most probable cause for total particle failure.
The NP-MHTGR program demonstrated that fuel could be designed and fabricated to meet as-
manufactured quality levels more stringent than previously achieved in the U.S. However, the 
irradiation performance of this fuel did not change appreciably from that of previous U.S. tests.
These results indicate that future particle fuel designs would benefit by considering the 
performance of the entire system of coating layers with respect to particle integrity under 
irradiation.
iii
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FOREWORD
This report documents the results of the NP-MHTGR fuel development program.  It was written 
in the early 1990’s, but never published.  With the recent renewed interest in gas reactors 
worldwide, the authors felt it was important to publish the report for the benefit of future gas 
reactor programs.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In August 1988, the Secretary of Energy announced a strategy to acquire New Production Reactor 
capacity of producing tritium.  The strategy involved construction of a New Production Modular 
High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (NP-MHTGR), and the Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) was selected as the Management and Operations contractor 
of the NP-MHTGR project.  The INEEL was also selected as the lead laboratory to develop the
target technology for the NP-MHTGR. Target particle development began immediately after the
announcement in August 1988.
The fuel technology development program, however, was not considered to be on the critical path 
for the NP-MHTGR project. Therefore, the fuel development program was initially expected to 
run concurrently with design of the NP-MHTGR with little risk to schedule. 
A Fuel Technology Working Group comprising members of the Department of Energy (DOE), 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), General Atomics, and the INEEL was formed in 1989.
The Working Group identified technical questions about the NP-MHTGR fuel configuration and
fuel manufacturing processes (last quarter FY-89) that might jeopardize a favorable Record of 
Decision for the NP-MHTGR in December 1991.  Based on these results, the NP-MHTGR Fuel
Development Program was initiated in January 1990 with the following objectives: 
x Develop fuel fabrication processes, quality control techniques, and test systems to ensure 
acceptable material usage and to produce fuel compacts on a full scale process line that meet
product and process specifications.
x Demonstrate and qualify the irradiation behavior of UCO fuel compacts and fission product
transport behavior in a prototypical NP-MHTGR operating environment under normal and 
accident conditions. 
x Develop and refine material property correlations and physical models, and independently
validate computerized design methods to predict fuel performance and fission product
behavior to specified predictive accuracies. These methods, models, and codes were to be 
used to demonstrate that fuel design met the DOE requirements related to normal operation 
and postulated accident conditions in the NP-MHTGR. 
The Working Group also designated the basic NP-MHTGR fuel configuration.  The NP-MHTGR 
fuel particle configuration selected in 1989 was derived from the NE-MHTGR (the commercial 
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version of the MHTGR) fuel configuration. The eight-layer TRISO (TRISO is the name for the 3-
layer coated particle with buffer, IPyC and OPyC) coating for the NP-MHTGR fuel particle 
included concentric layers (beginning at the fuel kernel surface) of low density pyrolytic carbon 
(buffer), high density pyrolytic carbon (IPyC), silicon carbide (SiC), high density pyrolytic
carbon (OPyC), and low density pyrolytic carbon (PPyC) with thin layers of extra-high density
pyrolytic carbon (seal coats) between the buffer and the IPyC and between the OPyC and PPyC.
The NE-MHTGR fuel kernel was 350 µm in diameter and was composed of low-enriched UCO.
The NP-MHTGR fuel particle used the same coating thicknesses as the TRISO coated NE-
MHTGR fuel to encapsulate a 200m µm diameter highly enriched UCO kernel.  An additional
seal coat was added to the outside of the PPyC to reduce any possible interaction between the fuel 
compact material and the fuel particle surface.  The NE-MHTGR fuel particle configuration had
not been verified, either by mechanistic structural analysis, or by irradiation testing. 
The NP-MHTGR and NE-MHTGR fuel particle configurations included four major changes from
the previous evolution (Fort St. Vrain) fuel particle:
(1) Fuel kernel was UCO rather than UC2
(2) The PPyC layer was added to reduce mechanical damage of the fuel particles during 
compacting a
(3) The IPyC layer was made thicker for added protection of the fuel kernel from HCl attack 
during SiC application
(4) Seal coats were added to both sides of the PPyC (for the NP-MHTGR and the inside only for 
the NE-MHTGR), and between the buffer and the IPyC.
The Fuel Development Program Plan (McCardell, 1990) was finalized in December 1990. 
Subsequent revisions were issued December 1991, (Rev. B), and September 1992, (Rev. C). 
Appendix A of the Fuel Development Program Plan is a comprehensive summary of gas-cooled 
reactor fuel and fission product behavior data available in the open literature.
Design of two capsules (designated NPR-1 and NPR-2) to irradiate NP-MHTGR test fuel 
specimens was initiated in January 1990.  One capsule was to demonstrate maximum service life
conditions of temperature, burnup, and high-energy neutron fluence.  The second capsule was to 
a The fuel particles together with graphite pitch and graphite shim particles are hot pressed into 12.5mm
diameter by 49.33mm long cylinders designated compacts and sealed at the top. The hot pressing and
sealing process is called compacting.
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be more representative of core peak average fuel temperatures.  These irradiations were 
subsequently performed in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at ORNL. 
In January 1990, a requisition was issued for a two-phased acquisition of initial Performance Test 
Fuel (PTF) that could be produced after construction of full-scale modular equipment, and 
subsequent proof test fuel that would be produced after construction of a full scale modular fuel 
process line. The PTF was manufactured by General Atomics and their subcontractor, Babcock 
and Wilcox. 
Program participants concluded that it was necessary to have a backup fuel irradiation test, NPR-
1A, for the NPR-1 test, conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the INEEL.  This 
increased the assurance that a bounding demonstration test would be completed even if the HFIR 
continued its operational uncertainty.  Design of the NPR-1A capsule began in January 1991.
The capsule was completed in September 1991 with PTF compacts loaded and an on-line state-
of-the-art fission product detection system in place. 
Although the PTF fuel fabrication campaign met with difficulties, the PTF was shipped to INEEL 
and ORNL on May 21, 1991, before it was needed for loading in the test capsules.  The PTF met 
the fuel product specifications and had the best “as manufactured” particle fuel quality ever 
produced in the United States. 
The NPR-1, NPR-2, and NPR-1A Capsule irradiations began on July 25, August 28, and October
2, 1991, respectively.  On December 12, 1991, with a peak burnup of 48% fissions per initial 
metal atom (FIMA), the on-line monitoring system detected a single particle failure in NPR 1-A.
Continued monitoring indicated about 2 additional particle failures each day until the irradiation 
was terminated on January 2, 1992.  A total of 48 particles was estimated to have failed at that 
time.  Although NPR-1A had reached a burnup of 64% rather than its original goal of 75%, it was 
decided to remove NPR-1A to allow the earliest possible assessment of the particle failures. The
NPR-1 and NPR-2 tests continued to operate with no particle failures.  There was high confidence 
that these two HFIR tests would be able to be irradiated to their maximum desired burnup and 
fluence levels.  However, in January 1992, NPR-1 had its first particle failure at a burnup of 72%
FIMA.  In February 1992, NPR-2, operating at a lower temperature than NPR-1 had its first 
particle failure at a burnup of 75%FIMA.  About 135 particles were estimated (by observed 
fission gas spikes) to have failed in NPR-2 and about 526 in NPR-1. About 700 out of 230,000
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particles contained in the three tests failed in contrast with the General Atomics model, which
predicted no failures.
When the NPR-1A fuel particles failed, fuel experts from all program participants convened in a 
workshop at the INEL in January 1992. As a result of this workshop, the Fuel Development
Program was reissued in September 1992 outlining a course of action to recover from the 
unexpected fuel failures.  However, closeout of the NP-MHTGR program was also announced in 
September 1992.  Work continued on the determination of the cause of the unexpected failure of 
the fuel particles through September 1993, when the NP-MHTGR Program was finally closed 
out.  During FY 93, work continued in the areas of exploratory process development of the NP-
MHTGR fuel, characterization of the as-manufactured PTF, and postirradiation examination of
the irradiated fuel from Capsules NPR-1, NPR-2, and NPR-1A.
This report describes fuel design and specification, fuel fabrication, including PTF 
characterization and exploratory process development, capsule irradiations and results, 
postirradiation examinations and results, probable causes of fuel particle failure during the 
irradiations, and recommendations for future MHTGR fuel development.
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2. FUEL DESIGN AND SPECIFICATIONS
2.1 Fuel Design 
Similar to previous U.S. gas reactor designs, the NP-MHTGR fuel element consists of a stack of 
cylindrical fuel compacts containing the fuel particles inserted into a graphite block.  As shown in 
Figure 2-1, the reference NP-MHTGR fuel particle consists of a highly enriched uranium
oxycarbide fuel kernel surrounded by an eight-layer TRISO coating. 
Figure 2-1.  The as-fabricated NP-MHTGR fuel particle.
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Figure 2-2.  Cross section of as-fabricated performance test fuel particle.
Uranium oxycarbide (UCO) was selected as the reference kernel fuel material based on its 
potential for superior performance over UO2 and UC2 (McCardell 1992).  The design of the NP-
MHTGR core required that the fuel kernel contain highly enriched uranium (HEU). 
The first layer of the TRISO coating is the buffer, a porous coating of low-density carbon, 100µm
thick, with a density of 0.8 to 1.1 g/cm3.  The purpose of the buffer is (a) to attenuate fission 
product recoils, thereby protecting the outer layers of the TRISO coating from damage, (b) to 
provide a void volume into which fission product and reaction gases produced during irradiation
can expand, (c) accommodate dimensional changes from kernel swelling or coating shrinkage, 
and (d) act as a sacrificial layer to minimize mass transfer reaction effects caused by the 
temperature gradient across the kernel.  The second layer is a seal coating, a dense anisotropic 
PyC about five µm thick.  This layer separates the buffer and IPyC to facilitate measurement of 
the IPyC coating density. The third layer of the TRISO coating is high density IPyC.  The 
primary purpose of the IPyC layer during fabrication is to protect the buffer and kernel from
chlorine intrusion during SiC coating.  The IPyC layer is ~50µm thick, with a density between 
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1.85 and 2 g/cm3.  The fourth layer is SiC, which is the primary barrier to the release of fission
products and the primary pressure boundary of the fuel system.  The SiC is cubic crystalline in 
structure, approximately 30µm thick, with a density in excess of 3.18 g/cm3.  The fifth layer is 
OPyC deposited on the SiC; it is ~ 30µm thick with a density between 1.8 and 1.95 g/cm3.  The 
sixth layer is a seal coat applied between the OPyC and PPyC to protect the OPyC from failure
induced by radiation shrinkage of the PPyC.  The PPyC is applied over the OPyC to prevent 
particle damage during compact fabrication. This seventh layer is low-density carbon ~ 50µm
thick with a density of 1 g/cm3.  The eighth layer is a final seal coat applied over the PPyC to 
facilitate the flow of particles through the metering and blending equipment used during compact
formation and to impede matrix impregnation of the PPyC.
The IPyC, the SiC, and the OPyC are designed to retain fission products and other reaction gases 
produced during irradiation.  The OPyC and IPyC will shrink during irradiation.  The OPyC
induces compressive stresses that partially offset the tensile stresses generated in the SiC layer, as 
will the IPyC if it remains bonded to the SiC. 
The fuel compact was composed of the coated fuel particles, a carbon matrix, and graphite shim.
The compact had a nominal finished diameter of ~ 12.5 mm.  Mixing the fuel particles with the 
shim before compacting provided a uniform method for obtaining different heavy metal loadings 
required by the core design while maintaining uniform dispersion of fuel throughout the compact.
Table 2-1 lists the normal operating and accident conditions selected by the designer for the NP-
MHTGR fuel.
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Table 2-1. Normal and accident conditions for the NP-MHTGR.
Normal Operating Conditions
Fuel temperature 700 to 1400ºC
Burnup <75%FIMA
Fast fluence <5 x 1025 n/m2
Environment Helium
Pressure 0.1 to 6.3 MPa 
Accident Conditions- Conduction Cooldown
Fuel temperature
       - Pressurized 
- Depressurized
900 to 1200ºC
1200 to 2000ºC
Environment Helium
Pressure (Depressurized) 0.1 MPa 
2.2 Fuel Specifications 
The radiological source term from a gas reactor during normal operation and during accidents 
depends on the levels of as-manufactured defects and the number of fuel failures that occur 
during irradiation.  Therefore, the reactor designer sets requirements for the fuel quality levels of 
fuel compacts as-fabricated and at the end of life. These quality requirements were derived by the
designer from top-level radionuclide control requirements for the NP-MHTGR, such as the 
allowable doses at the site boundary and to workers at the plant.  The quality requirements
specify limits for the as-manufactured heavy metal contamination and the fraction of defective 
particles at both the particle and compact level in terms of a mean and an upper 95% confidence 
level for the entire compact lot.  For end-of-life specifications, both 50 and 95% confidence limits 
are placed on the allowable fuel failure during normal operation and during design basis 
accidents.  These values minimize radiological doses to workers and to the public, with a safety
margin.  These quality specifications parallel those specified by the commercial MHTGR
program and thus did not take into account the role of the containment in the NP-MHTGR in 
reducing radiological doses to the environment.  These fuel quality requirements are shown in 
Tables 2-2 and 2-3. 
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Table 2-2. As-fabricated quality requirements for NP-MHTGR fuel.
Fraction of particles 
Quality requirements Mean 95% Confidence
Fuel Particles 
Missing buffer fraction 5.0 x 10-5(a) 1.0 x 10-4(b)
Missing OPyC fraction 1.0 x 10-4(a) 1.0 x 10-3(b)
Fuel Compacts
Defective SiC fraction 5.0 x 10-5(c) 1.0 x 10-4(d)
Heavy metal contamination
fraction (g U/g U in compact)
1.0 x 10-5(c) 2.0 x 10-5(d)
Total free uranium fraction(e) 6.0 x 10-5 1.2 x 10-4
Defective IPyC fraction 4.0 x 10-5(c) 1.0 x 10-4(d)
a. Particle composite mean.
b. 95% confidence that each particle composite mean is  the specified limit.
c. Fuel compact composite lot mean. 
d. 95% confidence that  5% of the compact lot mean exceeds the limit. 
e. Determined as the sum of the defective SiC fraction and heavy metal contamination fraction. 
Table 2-3. NP-MHTGR end-of-life fuel performance requirements.
NP-MHTGR driver fuel allowable fraction (core fraction) 
Parameter >50% Confidence >95% Confidence 
Fuel failure during normal
operation
1.0 x 10-4 4.0 x 10-4
Incremental fuel failure 
during design basis 
accidents
3.0 x 10-4 1.2 x 10-3
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3. FUEL FABRICATION
Fission products are contained within the NP-MHTGR fuel particles by SiC and carbon coatings.
Specified fuel particle dimensions and densities together with as-fabricated values for the PTF are
presented in Table 3-1.  Fuel particles are cast into carbon matrix compacts 12.5 mm in diameter
by 49.5 mm long to provide appropriate reactor core fuel density and to allow manual loading of
hexagonal carbon fuel element blocks. 
Table 3-1. Performance test fuel dimensions and densities.
Thickness DensityParticle Thickness
Spec. Mean
(µm)
As fabricated
(µm)
Spec. Mean 
(g/cm3)
As fabricated
(g/cm3)
UCO kernel 145-205 200 >10.3 10.51
Buffer carbon coating 90-100 102 0.8-1.10 0.96
IPyC + seal carbon
coats
40-60 53 1.85-1.95 1.92
Silicon carbide 30-40 35 3.18 3.23
OPyC + seal carbon 
coats
30-50 39 1.80-1.95 1.86
PPyC + seal carbon 
coats
40-60 47 0.80-1.10 1.06
NP-MHTGR dependence on retaining the fission products within the fuel particle results in 
classification of the fuel as a safety system of the reactor.  Fuel product specification must
provide the fuel product requirements for the fuel to meet reactor fission product retention goals.
The quality attributes and properties necessary for certifying the particles to the specification are
verified at various steps during the fabrication sequence. Because of the large number of fuel 
particles involved, fuel quality is tested using statistically sized samples.  Both average properties 
and population distributions of required characteristics are controlled to manage the product.
A diagram of material flow for the NP-MHTGR test fuel fabrication process is presented in 
Figure 3-1.  The individual fabrication processes are discussed in subsequent sections followed by
discussions of fuel development requirements, quality control testing, fuel characterization and 
exploratory process development.
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Figure 3-1.  Material flow for the NP-MHTGR test fuel fabrication process. 
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3.1 Fabrication of the Kernel 
Spherical ceramic UCO kernels can be manufactured using chemical precipitation or tower 
melting processes. After testing and evaluating internal and external gel precipitation, the NP-
MHTGR program decided to use the internal gel precipitation process.  Similarities and 
differences between these two processes are shown in Figure 3-2. Uranium oxide was obtained in 
the form of finely divided high surface area precipitated UO3.  The material was digested in nitric 
acid to form an acid-deficient uranyl nitrate solution. In the internal gelation process, carbon 
black with a dispersant was added to the solution to provide carbon for the final oxycarbide form,
and broth-forming urea (H2NCONH2) was added.  After slow chilling of the solution to below 
0°C, hexamethylene tetramine (HMTA, C6H12N4) was added.  The HMTA is unstable above 0°C
and decomposes on heating to release ammonia which precipitates the uranyl nitrate.  The broth 
was pulsed through needle orifices to form liquid droplets.  The droplets formed spheres and were 
heated as they dropped through a column of 60°C trichloroethylene (CH3CCl3) to form solid 
spherical fuel particles.  Ammonium hydroxide (NH4OH) washing was then used for stabilizing 
the spheres before water washing and air-drying.
The particles were calcined to remove all volatile materials and water of hydration, leaving a 
product of pure UO3 + C.  Finally, the kernels were sintered in a two-step cycle, initially using 
hydrogen near 1600°C to reduce the UO3 + C to UO2 + UC2, and then using argon and carbon 
monoxide near 1800°C to increase kernel density and adjust the carbon content in the kernel. A
fluidized bed sintering furnace was required to provide the extreme temperatures and obtain a 
chemically uniform product.  Particle adhesion to furnace surfaces and to other particles during 
sintering still resulted in some non-uniform distribution of oxide and carbide phases in the 
kernels.
Liquid waste from the internal gel process included NH4OH, water, and trichloroethylene.  The 
NH4OH was neutralized and sent to the wastewater treatment system with contaminated water.
Trichloroethylene was recycled by distillation.  Future production operations, however, should 
use a non-hazardous replacement heating fluid.
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Figure 3-2. Comparison of Kernel Fabrication Processes. 
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External gel precipitation, attempted early in the program, used a broth without an ammonia-
forming chemical.  The uranyl nitrate broth droplets fall through an ammonia gas to gel the 
external surface of the sphere.  The particle then falls through a countercurrent NH4OH bath to 
slowly precipitate the broth in the center of the sphere.  After precipitation, an isopropyl alcohol
wash is used to add carbon and remove NH4OH.  The particles are then water washed and dried. 
External gel precipitation was abandoned primarily because of difficulties obtaining adequate 
density and consistent sphericity without large voids. Process analysis also revealed that the 
mixed ammonia-alcohol liquid waste from the external process exhibited hazardous 
characteristics, causing a waste disposal problem. Fuel kernels manufactured for the program met 
all fuel specification requirements.
3.2 Coating Configuration
Application of PyC and SiC coatings was performed using chemical vapor deposition in a 
fluidized bed-coating furnace.  The furnace consisted of a conical bottom graphite cylinder with a 
two-inch inside diameter. The tube was induction heated with temperature measured optically.
Coating and diluent gases were valved from a controlled manifold into the bottom of the graphite
cone.  Characteristics of the deposited materials depended on reaction rate, temperature, and the 
chemical reaction involved.  The reaction rate was further determined by bed surface area and 
configuration, particle size, gas flow rate, laminar flow characteristics, and gas velocity through 
the reaction zone. The designs of the fluidization system and reaction zone of the furnace were
found to be critical in obtaining a consistent quality coating.  Fuel coating fluidization systems
delivered a constant flow of coating gases to the reaction zone at a consistent pressure to preclude
premature or delayed chemical reaction.  The furnace internal components were designed to keep
the particles in the reaction zone where the temperature is well controlled and where the chemical
vapors can react with the fuel particles before they nucleate to form an ash.  Fluid bed coating 
technology has been under development for many years and continues to be improved.
3.3 Buffer Coating
The low-density porous carbon buffer was applied through the exothermic cracking of acetylene
gas near 1300°C.  Acetylene was metered into the coater using argon as a diluent and as a 
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fluidizing gas.  Coating process parameters were adjusted to obtain an optimum level of porosity 
in the coating to maximize the void space for fission product collection. 
3.4 Seal Coating
A very thin (1-5µm) laminar seal coat was applied over the buffer to allow QC dimensional
inspectors to distinguish between coating layers and to prevent coating interactions.  The seal coat 
was applied using pyrolysis of propylene at a low coating rate.  Similar seal coatings were applied 
after OPyC coating and on the exterior of the PPyC layer.
3.5 Inner Pyrolytic Carbon Coating 
The inner pyrocarbon coating was added over the buffer and its seal coat to provide a high 
density, isotropic graphite boundary layer to seal the kernel from the SiC coating environment.
The IPyC also provided secondary protection for the SiC from fission recoils during irradiation.
Acetylene and propylene were pyrolized at about 1300°C to make the coating. Propylene
provided the higher density coating, but acetylene was added to minimize the endothermic nature
of propylene pyrolysis and stabilize the bed temperature.  The highest coating density was 
obtained by reducing coating temperature. The IPyC coating process for the NP-MHTGR was 
managed to optimize coating density.
3.6 Silicon Carbide Coating
As the primary load bearing and fission product diffusion barrier in the fuel system, the SiC 
properties were critical.  High strength, isotropy, and near theoretical density were obtained by
depositing columnar beta-phase SiC from methyltrichlorosilane (MTS) at low coating rates  (0.2-
0.4µm/min) between 1500 and 1650°C. Hydrogen was used as the diluent gas, and in the
reaction to form SiC.  Hydrogen was passed over heated MTS to carry the silane vapor into the 
high temperature reaction zone of the fluidized bed.  The chemical reaction involved was 
CH3SiCl3 + H2 = SiC + 3HCl + H2
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Density was optimized in the coating by using a high temperature (1650°C) at low coating rates 
with an excess of hydrogen.  Strength and grain size, however, could have been optimized near
1500°C.  Test fuel for the NP-MHTGR was coated to achieve the highest density, which was 
considered the most important parameter.
3.7 Outer Pyrolytic Carbon Coating 
The OPyC provided a secondary barrier to the release of fission gases, protected the SiC from
external corrosive environments, and pre-stressed the SiC layer to reduce its overall stress state
during irradiation.  Although similar to the IPyC, the outer pyrocarbon deposition temperature
and coating rate were increased to optimize the isotropic response of the coating and minimize
large microporosity.  Very small, closed micropores, however, were used in this coating to entrap 
fission gases and delay their diffusion. 
3.8 Protective Pyrocarbon Coating 
An outer buffer layer of protective pyrocarbon was applied to the NP-MHTGR fuel as a new 
design feature to minimize the potential for particle damage in handling and to prevent fuel 
particle fracture during compacting operations.  The PPyC layer was applied with the same
process as for buffer coating.
3.9 Compact Fabrication 
The fuel compact was a cylindrical rod containing fuel particles in a carbon matrix with the 
correct fuel loading for insertion into graphite fuel elements.  Compacts were fabricated by 
injecting a hot liquid carbon base matrix into a mold cavity containing fuel particles and enough 
graphite shim material to provide the desired fuel loading.  A number of different fuel loadings
would typically be used in the reactor core to control power distribution. 
The carbon-based matrix used for this program was a mixture of petroleum pitch, graphite filler,
octadecanol, and polystyrene. The matrix was injected at a maximum of 1000 psi at 160°C. The
conditions allowed filling of the compact mold but were below the pressures required for the 
angular graphite shim to cause fuel particle damage from edge contact.  After the mold was 
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cooled to solidify the matrix, the green compact was removed and packed in alumina power 
(Al2O3) for carbonization at 900°C.  Carbonization decomposed all organic compounds in the 
matrix to leave a solid carbon compact. Control of the alumina was critical to ensure adequate 
packing of the compact for dimensional stability and still allow for the escape of volatile
organics.
A petroleum pitch based matrix was used for the test fuel because the pitch came from an existing
batch, successfully used previously for test fuel.  Future production processes would require use
of a synthetic thermosetting resin based system that would allow tight control of chemistry and 
allow carbonization without using alumina packing. Petroleum pitch would be difficult to use in 
production because it lacks a tightly controlled chemical composition.  Both the chemistry and 
properties depended on the specific batch of crude oil from which it was processed. The NP-
MHTGR fuel was HCl gas leached after carbonization to remove iron contamination from the 
pitch, and to remove any uranium exposed during compacting from broken or failed particles.
The final step in manufacture of the compacts was a controlled heat treatment at 1650°C to 
stabilize the carbon matrix and drive off any remaining volatiles or hydrogen.
3.10 Fuel Loading
Fuel compacts used in an NP-MHTGR core would be loaded and sealed with graphite cement in 
predrilled hexagonal graphite fuel blocks (approximately 100 compacts/block) using a specific 
loading pattern.  The Fuel Development program, however, used irradiation test capsules 
consisting of fuel compacts loaded directly into tubular instrumented test assembles for 
accelerated irradiation tests.
3.11 Fuel Quality Control Testing 
Fuel manufactured for the NP-MHTGR program was manufactured to full ASME-NQA-1, 1989, 
standards and achieved a higher quality level than had been produced previously in the United 
States.  Fuel quality variables and attributes were measured extensively between fabrication steps 
to ensure conformance to fuel specification requirements.  A total of 54 property and impurity
spectra were analyzed and controlled during fuel processing. 
18
After completion of compacting, an additional series of tests were performed to verify the as-
manufactured quality of the fuel and predict how the fuel would perform during reactor operation.
The test included the following: 
x Defective IPyC Coating. This test located any dispersion of uranium from the kernel into the 
buffer by using radiography of burned back fuel particles (particles with outer pyrocarbon
coatings burned off).  Such dispersion indicates an inadequate IPyC coating, allowing HCl 
gas to reach and partially dissolve the fuel kernel. 
x Heavy Metal Contamination. This test determined the presence of fuel outside completely
coated particles by using high-temperature (1550°C) HCl gas leaching the compacts. 
x Burn Leach Test. This test involved destructive analysis achieved by burning the compact
and outer layer carbon away from fuel particles to expose SiC coatings, followed by leaching 
of the particles in a mixture of acids to dissolve any uranium not fully protected by the SiC.
The test identified any defective SiC and SiC damaged from compacting.  By subtracting the 
heavy metal contamination values from the values obtained in this test, a value for defective 
SiC coatings was obtained. 
x Krypton release-to-birth ratio (R/B). As a final verification of as-manufactured quality, this 
test irradiated finished compacts in a TRIGA reactor at 1000°C to establish an inventory of
the 85mKr, which was subsequently measured to establish the relative retentiveness of the fuel 
coatings.  Although an exact relationship between R/B and reactor performance did not exist, 
the very low values obtained verified that the as-manufactured quality was orders of 
magnitude better than previously manufactured test fuels. 
The successful results from the above tests indicate that the NP-MHTGR test fuel should perform
with exceptionally low fission product release in reactor service.  The irradiation test experience, 
however, did not correspond to the as-manufactured fuel quality test results. 
3.12 Fuel Development Requirements 
The NP-MHTGR program has shown that fuel particles and compacts could be manufactured
with very high statistical quality levels in test equipment.  Irradiation performance of that same 
fuel, however, demonstrated that the fuel was only as good as the product and design
specifications it was built to meet.  Putting particle fuel into production for full reactor loading, 
however, would require several technically and environmentally driven process adjustments,
equipment scale-up development, and process limits testing.
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Kernel fabrication was successful as a laboratory scale process.  Scale-up to production would 
require development of better control of and measurement of kernel chemical stoichiometry
(UO2 and UC2 distribution), while switching to non-hazardous or treatable chemical compounds
for forming kernels.  Stoichiometry control would require improving calcining and fluidized bed
sintering; furnace linings would need to be developed that do not hold particles or react with them
during processing.  A production method would also be needed to measure kernel stoichiometry 
and verify the adequacy of processing.  Trichloroethylene would need to be replaced for 
production kernel fabrication in favor of a non-hazardous material, and production facilities 
would need to have built-in liquid waste treatment systems capable of handling ammonium
hydroxide and other waste liquids. 
Fluid bed particle coating depends on coating temperatures, pressure, gas composition, gas 
velocity, gas concentration, and coater fluidization characteristics. Because of the variety of 
variables involved, considerable development work remains to be done in this field to optimize
the various coatings.  Processing methodology and tooling also require development work to 
eliminate potential coating contamination from trace metals associated with gas supplies, tooling
and furnace components.  Pyrocarbon coating processes were relatively well characterized in 
terms of the temperatures and gas relationships that would provide a specific coating density and 
isotropy.  Testing would still be needed, however, to characterize the variations in carbon 
structure and gas permeability resulting from process variables.  Initial development testing in the
exploratory development program (see Section 5.2) for example, shows that significant variability 
in coating quality was obtained using processes that produced almost identical density and 
isotropy.
Silicon carbide coating was perhaps the best-developed coating used in HTGR fuel, but additional 
studies would be needed to determine the optimum processing conditions and the methods to 
eliminate contamination and defects. The most notable defect observed in this program was a 
characteristic circumferential blister or gap within the coating, referred to as gold spot because of 
its characteristic color.  The spots were apparently caused by particle movement outside the 
normal coating zone caused by pressure fluxuations in the fluidized bed. Although not determined
to directly cause fuel failures, the defect indicates less than adequate process control and a 
potential need for coater configuration changes to ensure that particle coating occurs over a well-
defined and tightly controlled portion of the coater. 
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Compacting operations and full automation during scale-up were expected to require the most
development, because of the high integrity required and the volume of compacts that would need
to be manufactured, handled, and inspected. Initial development efforts would need to identify the
thermosetting resin material, shim graphite, and basic process parameters needed to obtain the 
required fuel particle densities without particle breakage or dimensional nonconformity.  In a 
parallel effort, improved methods to verify compact quality and the integrity of fuel particles 
within the compact would need to be refined.  Using the basic process parameters and developed 
QC methods, high quality automated equipment would then need to be designed, built, and tested 
to ensure that production processing would not degrade compact quality.
Particle fuel would be batch processed owing to the variety of QC tests required during 
fabrication. Scale-up was primarily a throughput question rather than one of size because much
of the equipment was already limited by considerations of nuclear criticality.
Statistically designed process tests would be needed to explore process limits.  The major process
variables and the effects and interrelationships between the variables must be known to ensure
specification of statistical process controls within which the product specification can be met with 
a high degree of reliability.  Such testing would also identify the processes that cannot be 
adequately controlled within the current product requirements.  As such, the tests would reveal 
where further process development was required.
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4. FUEL CAPSULE IRRADIATION
Three irradiation tests were performed to demonstrate that the PTF would meet the performance 
goals set for the NP-MHTGR.  Two tests, designated NPR-1 and NPR-2, were conducted in the
HFIR at ORNL (Baldwin 1993). The remaining test, designated as NPR-1A, was conducted in
the ATR at INEEL (Martinson 1993). These three capsule irradiations were part of a larger 
demonstration and qualification program for HEU-UCO fuel under normal and accident
conditions for the NP-MHTGR. A large population of fuel particles had to be tested to establish, 
with high statistical confidence, normal operation fuel performance as required by the fuel 
specification.  Furthermore, these demonstration experiments had to cover the normal operating 
temperature range and extend to full burnup and full fluence.  The ATR and HFIR both have the
capabilities to perform the required irradiations.  Both have large enough test cavities and the 
requisite instrumentation to perform the irradiations. However, the unperturbed thermal and fast 
fluxes in these facilities are so high that the irradiations resulted in the accumulation of burnup
and fluence about six times faster than that expected in the NP-MHTGR. 
The experiments were designed such that fuel compacts could be irradiated at or near the NP-
MHTGR design service conditions for temperature, burnup, and fast fluence.  (NPR-2 was at a 
slightly lower temperature than NPR-1 and NPR-1A).  Each experiment consisted of 
approximately 75,000 fuel particles in 16 to 20 compacts.  This population was sufficient to 
demonstrate a fuel defect level of ~ 1.8 x 10-4 at the 95% confidence level if ~ 7 or less fuel 
particles failed. The primary objective of the experiments was to provide data related to fuel 
performance by measuring fission gases released during irradiation (e.g. 85mKr). The release-to-
birth ratio (R/B), which is the measured fission gas release rate divided by the calculated fission 
gas birth rate, provided this measurement of fuel performance.  Increases in the R/B for a given 
fission gas isotope would indicate fuel failure.  This approach has been used historically in in-pile
fuel tests (Olander 1976). The design parameters for the three capsules were a peak volume
average temperature between 1000 and 1250˚C, end-of-life burnups from 60 to 75%FIMA, and a 
fast neutron fluence range from 2.5 x 1025 to 3.7 x 1025 n/m2 (E > 0.18 MeV)1. Table 4-1 lists the
peak values of the key experiment parameters attained in the NPR-1, 1A, and 2 capsules.  Details
of the three experiments are summarized in the following sections. 
1 All fast neutron fluences reported in this section are for E> 0.18 MeV.
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Table 4-1. Values of key experiment parameters in NPR capsules. 
Test Capsule
average
temp.(K)
Peak
temp.(K)
Peak fluence 
(*1025 n/m2)
Peak burnup 
(%FIMA)
Number of 
particles
NPR-1 974ºC 1246ºC 3.7 79% 77,500
NPR-1A 977ºC 1119ºC 2.0 64% 75,360
NPR-2 753ºC 1024ºC 3.7 79% 77,500
NP-MHTGR
core
600ºC 1250ºC 3.7 75% 1.8 x 1010
4.1 NPR 1A 
The NPR-1A experiment was irradiated in test position B-5 in the ATR.  The NPR-1A capsule
was instrumented to provide measurements of temperature, gas flow, neutron fluence, and fission 
gas release. Radial and axial schematics of the capsule internals are shown in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 
respectively. The capsule contained 20 compacts, each with about 3770 particles.  The fuel 
compact stack was approximately 1.22 m long, 0.017 m in diameter, and contained five neutron
fluence monitoring packages, two insulator pellets (aluminum oxide), and four graphite spacers
all equally spaced throughout the stack. The fuel compacts were positioned within an 
instrumented graphite sleeve housed in an outer stainless steel capsule.  The graphite sleeve was
grooved along the length of the outer surface to permit routing of the thermocouple leads and the 
gas inlet tubes.  The thermocouple leads and the gas tubing lines were held in place by four 
Inconel 600 bands around the outer circumference of the bonded sleeve. 
The neutron fluence monitors provided passive data on the thermal and fast fluence environment 
at five different axial elevations in the capsule.  Nine thermocouples were used to measure
temperatures at various axial and azimuthal locations on the graphite sleeve.  Fuel temperatures
during the experiment were calculated by thermal analysis.
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Figure 4-1.  Cross section of  NPR-1A capsule. 
25
Figure 4-2. Schematic of NPR-1A fuel capsule internals. 
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A gas supply was used to sweep and control the temperature of the fuel capsule during 
irradiation.  The gas entered the top of the capsule, flowed down the outside of the compact stack, 
and then up around the compacts to sweep out any fission products released from the fuel.  The 
gas was a mixture of helium and neon, the composition of which could be adjusted to maintain
temperatures relatively constant as the uranium was depleted during the irradiation. Upon exiting
the test capsule, the gas passed through a stainless steel particulate filter to trap any particles 
larger than 10 microns and into the fission product monitoring system.
The fission product monitoring system consisted of an on-line gamma-ray spectrometer and a 
sodium iodide detector that viewed a portion of the gas line.  This on-line instrumentation
provided almost instantaneous data on fission gas release during irradiation.  Upon leaving the 
monitoring system, the gas passed through a grab sampling system (which did not work during
most of the experiment) and into a delay tank to allow for decay of fission products. 
Irradiation of the NPR-1A capsule began on October 2, 1991, and was terminated after 64.2 full
power days. The calculated compact centerline temperatures, compact average burnup, and 
compact average fast neutron fluence during the experiment are plotted in Figures 4-3, 4-4, and 4-
5. Calculated temperatures remained within a 100ºC band in the upper and lower quadrants of the
capsule. In the middle two quadrants, where the greatest uranium depletion (highest burnup) 
occurred, helium-neon gas control resulted in a slightly wider temperature variation (~ 200ºC).
Peak temperatures were about 1119ºC. The dips in the axial temperature distribution correspond
to the locations of graphite spacers, insulators, or neutron monitors.  The effect of axial cosine 
shaped neutron flux distribution in the ATR is apparent in the shape of the burnup and fast 
fluence curves in Figures 4-4 and 4-5.  The peak compact average burnup was 64%FIMA in the 
middle compacts, and the peak fluence was 2.0 x 1025 n/m2.
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Figure 4-3. Compact centerline temperatures for Test NPR-1A. 
Figure 4-4.  Average fuel burnup for NPR-1A compacts.
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Figure 4-5. Average fast fluence for NPR-1A compacts.
Figure 4-6 is a plot of the 85mKr R/B during the experiment.  The R/B remained low during the
first 42 full power days of the experiment.  However, on December 12, 1991 (71.4 elapsed days
in Figure 4-6), the R/B increased from a value of 4 x 10-9 to 3.8 x 10-7, indicating particle failure.
The initial particle failure occurred at a peak fluence of 1.27 x 1025 n/m2, a peak burnup of 
47%FIMA, and a peak temperature of 1133ºC . Based on this initial failure, an estimate of the 
R/B for a failed particle can be made:
(R/B)particle  = [(R/B)after one failure – (R/B)before failure ]* Number of particles 
     = [3.8 x 10-7 – 4 x 10-9] * 75,360 = 0.028
The 85mKr R/B continued to increase over time to a peak value of 1.8 x 10-5 .  Based on the peak 
R/B, the total number of particle failures in NPR-1A is estimated to be 
Number of failures = (1.8 x 10-5) * 75, 360/ 0.028 = ~ 48 
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Figure 4-6. NPR-1A release-to-birth ratio for 85mKr before and after first particle failure.
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4.2 NPR 1 and 2 
The NPR 1 and 2 experiments were irradiated in the HFIR for a total of eight cycles.  The 
capsules were instrumented to provide measurements of temperature, gas flow, neutron fluence,
and fission gas release.  Radial and axial schematics of the capsule are shown in Figures 4-7 and
4-8, respectively.  The irradiation capsule consists of a double contained, single, purged cell 
containing 16 fuel compacts surrounded by H-451 graphite fuel bodies. Pure helium gas sealed
between the primary and secondary Inconel-718 containment vessels served as a containment
integrity monitor during irradiation.  The graphite holders contained the fuel compacts, flux 
monitors, thermocouples, and encapsulated, unbonded fuel particles known as piggyback
samples. (The piggyback samples were designed to study key aspects of fission product behavior
in the fuel particle.) The fuel particle loadings in each region were varied to compensate for the 
axial flux distribution in HFIR and allow for a somewhat more uniform heat generation rate along 
the capsule.  The individual compact loadings varied between ~ 3600 and 6000 particles per 
compact.  The total number of particles in each capsule was calculated to be 77, 500.
The NPR 1 and 2 capsules each contained 27 thermocouples incorporated into four discrete 
thermocouple array tubes.  These thermocouples were used to measure temperatures at various 
axial and azimuthal locations in the graphite holder. Fuel temperatures during the experiment
were then calculated by thermal analysis using the temperature measured in the graphite holder. 
A helium-neon gas mixture flowed between the graphite fuel holder and the primary containment
wall, providing active temperature control.  By adjusting the relative concentration of the two 
gases, the thermal conductivity of the sweep gas was varied to control the radial heat flow to the 
HFIR cooling water.  The flow rate and gas mixture were adjusted for fine tuning of the fuel 
compact temperatures which were monitored by the thermocouples in the graphite holder. The
gas tubing was also monitored for radioactivity.  In each case, 15 feet of the sweep gas tube was 
coiled around a radiation detector.  In NPR-1, this system consisted of two ionization chambers.
In NPR-2, two Geiger-Müller (GM) monitors were used.  This system is sensitive enough to 
discern single particle failures by the burst of activity associated with such events.  Samples of
the sweep gas were also collected periodically and analyzed off line for their fission gas content. 
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Figure 4-7. A schematic cross section of the NPR-1/2 irradiation capsule, showing the fuel 
compacts, thermocouple bundles, flux monitors and encapsulated specimen cavities and the 
sweep gas feed. The gas returns through the gap between the graphite and the Inconel-718
primary containment.  The HFIR colling water is in contact with the outer wall of the secondary 
containment.
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Figure 4-8.  NPR-1 Fuel compact loading scheme.
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Irradiation on NPR-1 capsule began July 25, 1991, and was completed on May 29, 1992, at a 
peak fluence of 3.7 x 1025 n/m2.  The calculated capsule average temperature is plotted as a 
function of time in Figure 4-9.  The calculated temperatures ranged from 727 to 1027ºC.
Temperatures remained fairly constant over the first three cycles.  However, there was a gradual 
decrease in temperatures during the last three cycles as the uranium was depleted from the 
compacts.  Figure 4-10 is a plot of the fast fluence and Figure 4-11 is a plot of the burnup in the
four zones of the NPR-1 capsule. The results indicate that most of the compacts achieved very 
high burnup and fluence during the irradiation.  Two positions within the HFIR were used 
causing most of the burnup to be attained in the first three cycles before significant amounts of 
fast fluence were accumulated.  In the last five cycles, the fuel saw a high fast fluence and a lower 
burnup rate. 
Figure 4-12a is a plot of the 85mKr R/B during the NPR-1 experiment.  The R/B remained low 
(~10-8) during the first 120 full power days.  However, on January 2, 1992, at a peak fluence of 
1.7 x 1025 n/m2, the R/B increased to 1.7 x 10-7 indicating particle failure.  The peak burnup and
temperature at the time of the first particle failure were 72%FIMA and 1123ºC, respectively. The
85mKr R/B continued to increase during the irradiation and reached a final value of ~ 3 x 10-4 at 
the end of the experiment. Based on these results and activity spikes recorded by the ionization 
chamber, 526 particles were estimated to have failed. 
Irradiation of the NPR-2 capsule began August 28, 1991, and was completed on May 29, 1992, at 
a peak fluence of 3.7 x 1025 n/m2. The calculated capsule average temperature is plotted as a 
function of time in Figure 4-13.  The calculated temperatures ranged from 597 to 897ºC.  Figure
4-14 is a plot of the fast fluence and Figure 4-15 is a plot of the burnup in the four zones of the
NPR-2 capsule.  As in the case of NPR-1, the results indicate that most of the compacts achieved
high fluence during the irradiation.  Most of the burnup was attained before the significant 
amounts of fast fluence were accumulated.
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Figure 4-9.  NPR-1 capsule averaged fuel compact temperature and the maximum local fuel 
compact temperature as a function of irradiation time.
Figure 4-10.  Calculated fast fluence as a function of irradiation time for the NPR-1 test. 
35
(1025 n/m2)
Figure 4-11. NPR 1 capsule fast neutron fluence versus burnup (%FIMA).
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b.
Figure 4-12.  a.  NPR-1 calculated R/B ratios as a function of full power days for 85mKr and 
88Kr. b.  NPR-1 calculated R/B ratios as a function of full power days for 133Xe and 138Xe.
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Figure 4-13.  NPR-2 capsule averaged fuel compact temperature and the maximum local fuel
compact temperature as a function of irradiation time.
Figure 4-14.  Calculated fast fluence as a function of irradiation time for the NPR-2 test. 
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Figure 4-15. NPR 2 capsule fast neutron fluence versus burnup (%FIMA)
Figure 4-16 is a plot of the 85mKr R/B during the experiment.  The R/B remained low (<10-8)
during the first 120 full power days.  However, on February 11, 1992, at a peak fluence of 2.0 x 
1025 n/m2, the R/B increased to 7 x 10-7, indicating particle failure.  The peak burnup and
temperature at the time of particle failure were 75%FIMA and 960ºC, respectively.  The 85mKr
R/B continued to increase during the irradiation and reached a final value of ~ 6 x 10-5 at the end
of experiment.  Based on these results and activity spikes recorded by the Geiger-Müller 
monitors, 135 particles were estimated to have failed. 
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Figure 4-16. a. NPR-2 calculated R/B ratios as a function of full power days for 85mKr and 
88Kr. b.  NPR-2 calculated R/B ratios as a function of full power days for 133Xe and 138Xe.
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4.3 Comparison with Previous Gas Reactor Irradiations 
The three NP-MHTGR fuel irradiation capsules initially performed with very low gas release, in 
the range of 10-9 to 10-8 85mKr R/B.  Prior U.S. capsules containing TRISO fuel typically exhibited
10-7 to 10-5 85mKr R/B, as illustrated in Figure 4-17. The HRB-21 capsule initially ran with 85mKr
R/B of approximately 1.5 x 10-8. Within the first month of irradiation (approximately 3%FIMA
and 0.5 x 1025 fluence), however, the HRB-21 capsule containing NE-MHTGR fuel began having
fuel failures.  At the capsule EOL (3.5 x 1025 n/m2 fluence), HRB-21 reached an 85mKr R/B of 
approximately 2 x 10-4.
As illustrated in Figure 4-18, other older, U.S. capsules began irradiation with an 85mR/B of about 
10-6 85mKr R/B and ended at about 5 x 10-4.  Thus, the previous capsules ended at about the same 
R/B, but began with significantly larger exposed uranium fractions.  The NP-MHTGR capsules
performed with no particle failures until relatively high burnups: 47%FIMA for NPR-1A,
72%FIMA for NPR-1, and 75%FIMA for NPR-2. Past capsules (SLS-2, HRB-21, R2-K13, etc.) 
failed much earlier in burnup, but contained low amounts of enriched uranium.  The fast fluences 
for onset may have been similar, but the early failures are somewhat masked by high initial 85mKr
R/B.  The EOL R/Bs for all the capsules are similar.  Plotting these versus EOL conditions of 
burnup, fast fluence, and capsule peak temperatures indicate no observable dependence except for 
a slight dependence on temperature. This dependence may be explained solely by the R/B 
behavior of a single particle with an exposed kernel versus temperature. It appears, therefore, that 
the root causes of TRISO particle failures in U.S. capsules had never been adequately addressed.
We believe, however, that the performance of the NP-MHTGR capsules presents strong evidence
for a feasible NPR reactor, because the core conditions are well enveloped by the irradiation 
conditions for the capsules.  Feasible core fuel management options could further increase the 
margin of the core operating envelope by reducing peak fuel temperature, fluences, and burnups 
closer to the average values for these parameters.
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mFigure 4-17. 85mKr R/B versus burnup for various U.S. irradiations.
Fast Fluence 1025 n/m2 (E>0.18 MeV)
m
Figure 4-18. 85mKr R/B versus fast fluence for various U.S. irradiations. 
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5. POSTIRRADIATION EXAMINATION
As part of the NP-MHTGR Fuel Development Program (McCardell, 1992), a comprehensive
postirradiation examination of the three irradiation capsules was planned to characterize the fuel 
performance and fission product behavior.  The results were to be used to improve and validate
models of fuel performance and fission product transport under normal operating and accident 
conditions. However, given the much higher than expected fuel failures evident from
measurements of fission gas release during all three irradiations, it was decided to concentrate on 
examinations that would determine the cause(s) of fuel particle failure rather than investigate the 
fuel response to accident conditions.  Examinations of both unirradiated fuel and irradiated test
articles were used to determine the cause(s) of failure.
A variety of examination techniques were used to obtain information on the failure fraction of 
fuel particles in individual compacts and on the nature of the failures.  The fraction of exposed 
kernels (failure of all protective coatings: IPyC, SiC, OPyC, PPyC) was measured by R/B as a 
result of reactivating compacts in a TRIGA reactor and by a leach-burn-leach (LBL) procedure 
carried out on one compact.  The fraction of particles with SiC failure was measured by (a) 
radioisotope inventory of individual particles in the irradiated microsphere gamma analyzer
apparatus after compact deconsolidation, (b) the initial leaching steps before burning of the LBL 
procedure, and (c) examination by optical microscopy of metallographic cross sections of 
compacts.  These measurement techniques and their results are discussed in the following 
paragraphs, as are observations of kernel and coating layer conditions by metallography and
fission product migration in fuel particles by scanning electron microscopy, which relate to SiC 
failure mechanisms.
5.1. Fuel Characterization 
Initial irradiation testing of NP-MHTGR test fuel resulted in less than expected in-reactor 
performance.  To obtain additional data for postirradiation examinations and to obtain more
detailed information on fuel quality, a series of characterization tests was performed on fuel 
sample material.  Characterization analyses centered around the kernel, the silicon carbide, and 
methods of accurately predicting the expected fission product release from the particles. 
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Kernel Characterization
Because the fuel kernel chemistry was critical to management of fission products, the phases and 
phase distribution of fuel kernels were studied. Both oxygen and carbon-to-uranium ratios were
determined during fabrication.  The values, however, were obtained from dissolution and
chemical analysis of samples of particles.  A method was developed for kernel characterization
that involved a quantitative phase distribution analysis of individual kernels.  The individual
particle analysis revealed that the fabrication analysis work was correct but the distribution had a 
tail primarily on the high carbide side.  The high carbide phase distribution variants resulted from
adherence of fuel to graphite container walls during sintering.  A potential solution to the problem
was to sinter particles using a specially developed NbO2 furnace liner, for which the particles 
have no affinity.
Silicon Carbide Characterization 
The microstructure and strength of several different batches of SiC were studied extensively to
determine if the NP-MHTGR SiC was inferior to the SiC used on other fuels manufactured at 
different times or by different vendors. 
Optical ceramography and scanning electron microscopy (SEM) were used to thoroughly
characterize as-manufactured fuel particle quality.  NP-MHTGR SiC was determined to have a
larger columnar grain structure than other SiC samples.  In some cases, single grains extended 
nearly through the coating.  The evaluation found evidence of lenticular voids and flaws in the 
SiC (called gold spots because of their appearance) that slightly decreased the structural strength 
of the SiC.  The gold spot formation was determined to be the result of fuel particles leaving the
reaction zone of the furnace during coating and contacting furnace surfaces to get contaminated
with SiC ash, which was then sealed in the coating when the particle re-entered the reaction zone.
Other fuels did not exhibit the gold spot defects. Contamination of the NP-MHTGR SiC was also 
observed in this study.  The contamination, generally on the surface of the coating, was from
chromium and nickel, presumably from sampling and handling equipment.  Most of the other
fuels tested also exhibited metallic contamination on the exterior surface of the coating. 
SiC strength testing was performed with equipment to apply point source and dimple (distributed) 
compressive loads on the unsupported coated particle (Lessing, 1993).  Finite element analysis
44
revealed that point source loading put a small portion of the inner SiC surface under maximum
tensile stress.  The dimple loading tests stressed a large volume of the SiC with very high tensile 
loads.  Sample sizes of 500 particles were tested for each fuel. Tests were performed both on the 
complete particles and with outer pyrocarbons burned away.  Failure statistics on each group of 
500 particles were analyzed using the traditional Weibull methodology.
It was found that dimple loaded specimens provided much lower strength than point source 
loaded particles, probably because of the higher stress distribution over a larger portion of the
coating with the dimple loading.  The coating strength was found to be determined by the type
and size of flaws present in the coating rather than by the base material properties.  Lowest 
strength particles were those with large flaws or cracks in the coating.  Metallic inclusions 
(primarily Cr and Ni) in the SiC also accounted for low strength. Gold spot particles were tested
as a group, but did not show a large decrease in measured strength.  Flaws associated with the 
gold spots however, appear to contribute to a low strength tail to the strength distribution.  No 
deterioration in strength appeared to occur in the particles as a result of compacting, and some
apparent healing or blunting of stress concentrators apparently occurs as a result of the 
compacting heat treatment operations.  SiC manufactured by adding successive coatings without 
intermediate fuel removal and sampling was found to have the least coating contamination.  The 
strength of the SiC in the PTF fuel was not significantly different than other particle type fuels.
Fission Product Release Prediction 
Operation of a New Production Reactor will depend upon being able to accurately predict the life 
of the fuel and how it will perform during reactor service.  The methods specified to predict such
performance of the test fuel were inadequate.  Alternate methods, including cesium release,
methylene iodide intrusion, and mercury intrusion were evaluated to determine if they could 
accurately predict the performance actually obtained with the fuel.
Cesium release was expected to be a quality baseline for the fuel.  At high temperatures
(1600°C), cesium is released essentially immediately through pyrocarbon but is still retained by 
high quality SiC.  Cesium release testing of PTF particles and comparison with other similar
particles show that the PTF particles had defect fractions approximately an order of magnitude
higher than indicated in standard fuel quality tests.  The as-fabricated defect fraction, however, 
was not adequate to explain the fuel’s in-reactor performance.  The best SiC tested was about 3 
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times more retentive of cesium than the test fuel.  Testing shows that cesium release was
impractical in terms of time and irradiation required as a defect measurement tool.  More 
importantly, it was shown that the test could not adequately identify fuel that would be expected 
to fail in reactor service because the in-service failures were not caused by initially defective SiC.
Mercury intrusion was tested by burning back and etching SiC coated particles and inserting them
in a Hg penetrometer installed in a porosimeter, then pressurizing them for 30 minutes.  After 
pressurization and slow pressure dissipation, the particles were removed and all external Hg was 
cleaned from their surfaces.  Radiography was used to obtain evidence of Hg intrusion into the
particle.  Tests were performed at different pressures to determine whether any pressure-related
differences affected test capability.  The Hg intrusion test was found to be effective at identifying
failed particles, but it was also responsible for breaking some particles, especially at higher 
intrusion pressures.  Failures were found both from the initial pressurization and as a result of the 
pressurized Hg inside the particles after removal of external pressure.  Radiographs were found 
difficult to interpret where small quantities of Hg were noted, and it could not be discerned
whether contamination was internal or external. 
Methylene iodide intrusion testing was performed by preparing particles as in the Hg intrusion 
test, followed by immersion in liquid CH2I2 for 16 hours at 0.69MPa (100psig).  Sample particles
were then surface cleaned and rapidly heated to 900°C to break down defective particles that 
were holding the iodide.  A standard burn leach test was then used to ensure identification of the 
particles that had failed as a result of internal iodide expansion.  The test was also highly effective 
in identifying failed particles.  However, the fuel particles that had the highest quality according 
to cesium release tests results tended to fail at a very high rate with the iodide test. 
Sample preparation for the methylene iodide test was shown to have a significant effect on the 
results obtained.  The burn back of the particles was performed at 750°C for 144 hours.  It is 
thought that very small defects in the high quality SiC allowed oxygen to pass through the SiC, 
burning out a cavity for the iodide and resulting in particle failure on heating.  This indicates that 
the burn leach test would also be more effective if more aggressive burnback is used in sample
preparation.
Both methylene iodide and Hg intrusion tests could be correlated with burn leach test results for
all but particles determined to have high quality using the Cesium release test.  None of the tests, 
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however, provided a good correlation with cesium release test results.  The methylene iodide test 
showed promise as a manufacturing QC tool with the capability of finding defects as small as 13
nm.
5.2 Exploratory Process Development 
Some process exploration was performed to determine the relationship between process 
parameters used for deposition of coatings and relative changes in product quality resulting from
variations in process parameters.  Such testing was limited by both time and funding because of
the closeout of the NP-MHTGR program.
A statistical test program was devised that used a central composite experimental design to test
ten settings of two variables.  The ten tests were divided into two series.  The first series included 
four scoping runs at the boundaries of the process feasibility field and a central point based on 
previous experience.  The second set used one point to replicate the central point and four others
to obtain more information around the optimum calculated from the first series.  This test 
program was executed on the IPyC coating to study the effect of the coating gas to total gas ratio 
(CGR) and the total gas velocity to minimum fluidization ratio (U/Umf) on QC characteristics of
the coating. By statistically testing two variables simultaneously, both the effects and the 
interrelationships between the variables and coating quality were determined.  The effects of the
variables on coating density, microporosity, isotropy, and HCl gas permeability were determined 
for the test fuel. Contour plots were developed that showed the effect of the coating variables on 
each fuel coating property by mathematically evaluating coating variables in comparison with the 
measured coating properties. By comparing plots developed for key properties, an optimum
coating process and reasonable coating process limits could be selected for future coating efforts. 
The test shows that the CGR has a strong effect on the permeability of the coating, but that the
U/Umf  has very little effect on any of the examined quality parameters.  The test sequence defined
an optimum process for depositing the IPyC coating and demonstrated that even highly 
experienced technical personnel could not predict the process requirements for an optimum
coating.  Review of several historical fuels show that the processes used in several cases were
marginal at best for providing the desired pyrocarbon attributes.  Exploratory type testing would 
be required to optimize other coatings prior to putting the particle fuel into production.
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5.3 Irradiated Exposed Kernel Fraction 
Eight of the 16 compacts from each of the NPR-1 and NPR-2 capsules and all 20 of the compacts
from capsule NPR-1A were given a standard fission gas release test in the TRIGA Mark 1 
Reactor Facility at General Atomics.  In this test, fission gas release was measured under 
irradiation for 30 minutes while the compact was held at 1100ºC.  The fraction of exposed kernels
in each compact was obtained by dividing the measured R/B values by the R/B for an exposed 
kernel (varied from 0.030 to 0.043, depending on the irradiation exposure of the compact) under 
the conditions of the TRIGA R/B testing.
The eight compacts tested from each of the capsules (NPR-1 and NPR-2) were from the bottom
half of these capsules, which were symmetrically located about the axial mid plane of the HFIR 
reactor with respect to the compacts in the top half of the capsules.  Symmetry of burnup and fast
fluence between compacts in the top and bottom halves of the capsule was assumed to lead to 
symmetry in TRIGA R/B values used to calculate the capsule average exposed kernel fraction.
The capsule average values of exposed kernel fraction are compared with values based on end-of-
life (EOL) in-pile R/B and counting radiation spikes (assumed to correspond to the release of 
fission gas upon particle failure) in the effluent coolant gas in Table 5-1.  The ratios of exposed
kernel fraction by TRIGA R/B to those based on EOL R/B indicate that values derived from
TRIGA R/B were higher by factors that increase with decreasing irradiation temperatures.
Apparently, TRIGA R/B testing at 1100ºC caused an enhanced fission gas release rate relative to 
the fission gas release rate at the end-of-life in the lower temperature irradiations. The agreement
between values of exposed kernels derived from EOL R/B and radiation spikes is remarkably
good.
In addition to the high temperature of the TRIGA testing relative to irradiation temperatures,
uncertainties were encountered both in extrapolation of the 30 minute data to steady state R/B 
values and in the U-235 content of high burnup compacts, which affected the calculation of 
fission gas birth rate. These uncertainties severely limit the usefulness of the TRIGA R/B results
and suggest the need for improvements in this technique.  However, the plots of particle failure 
fractions in individual compacts in Figure 5-1 indicate that the exposed kernel fraction was a 
strong function of fast fluence, in agreement with the capsule R/B data from the irradiations. 
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Table 5-1. Comparison of exposed kernel fraction derived from TRIGA R/B, EOL R/B, and 
radiation spikes in experiment off gas. 
Capsule average
Exposed kernel fraction 
EOL
RatioVol. Ave. Capsule
Spikes EOL R/B* TRIGA R/B TRIGA/ EOL Temp.( ºC)
NPR-1A 0.00064 0.00064 0.0026 4.1 977
NPR-1 0.0068 0.0025 0.104 4.2 974
NPR-2 0.0017 0.0011 0.090 82 753
*Assumes 85m Kr R/B for a failed particle = 0.028 for NPR-1A, 0.012 for NPR-1, and 0.054 for NPR-2 with
EOL R/B for NPR-1A = 1.8 x 10-5
EOL R/B for NPR-1 =   3 x 10-4
EOL R/B for NPR-2 =   6 x 10-5
Figure 5-1. Exposed kernel fraction (from normalized TRIGA R/B) versus fast fluence, 
temperature and burnup.
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A leach-burn-leach (LBL) procedure was carried out on compact NPR-1 B6.  It consisted of a 24-
hour leach in boiling concentrated nitric acid (14 M), plus hydrofluoric acid (.03 M) to dissolve 
kernels that had been exposed by the failure of all the coating layers. This was followed by a burn 
in air at 750ºC for 48 hours to remove all compact matrix and PyC layers (including any intact
IPyC beneath failed SiC), and finally a 48-hour leach (under the same conditions as above) to 
dissolve any kernels exposed by the burn, providing a measure of the fraction of particles with 
failed SiC but intact IPyC layers.  The 95Zr and 144Ce contents of the leach solutions were 
determined by radiochemical analysis.  These fission products were expected to remain with the
kernel and serve as a measure of the fraction of the kernels in the compact dissolved in the leach
solutions.  The results of these measurements are included in Table 5-2 and show reasonable 
agreement with results of SiC failure fraction based on other measurements.  Although used to a 
very limited extent in this PIE, LBL showed promise as a method for determining exposed kernel
fraction and SiC failure fraction in irradiated compacts, and is a candidate for continued
development.
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Table 5-2. Particle Failure in NP-MHTGR fuel compacts. IMGA Met LBL*LBL** 
SiC failure fraction Exposed
kernel
Compact Fast
fluence
(1025 n/m2
Burnup
(%FIMA)
IMGA Met LBL* LBL**
NPR-1
A5
NPR-1
B4
NPR-1
B5
NPR-1
B6
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.5
79
79
79
78
0.038a
0.02b
0.03/0.006f
0.014 0.013
NPR-2
A4
NPR-2
B4
3.7
3.7
79
79 0.002c
0.06/0.03g
NPR-1
A8
NPR-1
B8
2.3
2.3
73
73 0.002d
0.00/0.00h
NPR-1
A9
NPR-1
A1
1.9
1.9
64
62 0.002e
0.06/0.01j
a. 22 failures out of 582 particles examined
b. 19 failures out of 972 particles examined
c.   1 failure out of 424 particles examined
d.   1 failure out of 500 particles examined
e.   1 failure out of 450 particles examined
f.   1 failure out of 39 particles with kernels/ 1 failure out of 178 particles with or
        without kernels
g. 5 failures out of 84 particles with kernels/ 8 failures out of 287 particles with or
  without kernels
h. 0 failures out of 53 particles with kernel/ 0 failures out of 260 particles with or 
  without kernels
i.   1 failure out of 17 particles with kernel/ 1 failure out of 83 particles with or
  without kernels
LBL*  Based on an average of fractions of 95Zr and 144Ce leached during a 24-hour leach before 
burn and 48-hour leach after burn. 
LBL** Based on an average of fractions of 95Zr and 144Ce leached during a 24-hour leach before 
burn.
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5.4 Irradiated SiC failure fraction 
Compacts from the NPR-1 and NPR-2 capsules were deconsolidated by an electrochemical
process, and compact NPR-1A 13 was deconsolidated by burning to obtain particles for IMGA
(individual microsphere gamma analyzer) examination to determine the fraction of particles with 
failed SiC.  The IMGA measured the content of gamma-emitting nuclides in individual particles.
The ratio 137Cs/ 144Ce was used as a measure of SiC integrity. 144Ce remained within exposed 
kernels, whereas 137Cs could only be retained by an intact SiC layer.  Values of SiC failure 
measured by IMGA are presented in Table 5-2. The values of 0.02 and 0.038 measured on the
high fluence compacts NPR-1 B4 and B5 are in reasonable agreement with the value of 0.014 
obtained from LBL for compact NPR-1 B6.  Agreement between values of exposed kernel 
fraction and SiC failure fraction was expected, given the large fractional failure of the PyC layers
discussed below. 
Optical metallography of compact cross sections was used primarily to characterize the condition 
of the kernel and coating layers, to measure failure fractions of PyC layers, and to investigate SiC 
failure mechanism.  When SiC failure fractions exceed 0.01, metallography can also provide data
on SiC failure fraction, since, frequently, the number of particles examined in cross sections of a 
compact is about 100. Two numbers are given in Table 5-2 for the SiC failure fraction determined 
by metallography.  The first number resulted from the examination of particles in which the 
kernel was retained through the grinding and polishing process, the second includes all particles 
examined, with or without kernels.  There appeared to be a tendency for metallography to 
overestimate SiC failure fraction relative to other methods, especially when using the relatively 
smaller number of observations based only on particles containing kernels.
The comparison of particle failure fractions in Table 5-2 points to the necessity of measuring a 
sufficient number of particles to obtain reasonable statistical significance in the results.  Methods 
that use all the particles in a compact, such as TRIGA R/B and LBL, were attractive.  In principle,
IMGA could also be used to examine a large fraction or all the particles in a compact, but in 
practice, the handling of individual particles, even though automatic in the IMGA machine, was 
time consuming, resulting in a throughput of about 250 particles per day.
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5.5 Irradiated Kernel and Coating Layer Conditions 
Metallography of cross-sectioned compacts is a powerful tool for observing the condition of the
kernel and coating layers of the TRISO fuel particle.  The technique required care in epoxying to 
retain fuel particles and in polishing to avoid producing artifacts and to reveal cracking, porosity,
material interactions in layers, and photography to record the observations.  Judgement is 
required in the selection of compacts on which to apply this time consuming, but essential,
examination process. 
Kernels were observed to contain large gas voids and to have undergone swelling at the high 
burnups in the NP-MHTGR irradiations (up to 79%FIMA).  Generally, the kernels retained a 
spherical shape and were contained in the densified buffer coating, as illustrated in Figure 5-2.
Occasionally, the buffer cracked radially and the swelling kernel extruded through the crack to 
the IPyC layer, as shown in Figure 5-3. No chemical attack of the IPyC by the kernel or by fission
products was observed. 
Most often, shrinkage of the buffer led to the opening of an annular gap between the buffer and
the IPyC, as in Figure 5-2. In only about 5% of the buffers did irradiation-induced densification 
of the buffer lead to the formation of radially oriented shrinkage cracks as in Figure 5-3. Radial 
cracks were observed in IPyC layers with increasing frequency as a function of fast fluence, 
occurring in up to 65% of the particles in a compact cross section at the highest exposure.  The
cause of these cracks was thought to be irradiation-induced shrinkage of the IPyC, which was 
thicker than the IPyC layers previously used (53 versus 35µm) and less isotropic [Bacon
anisotropy factor, optical (BAFo) = 1.06 vs. <1.04 for optimal performance]. The IPyC had been
made thicker to reduce the chemical interaction of kernels with corrosive gases during SiC 
coatings in the particle manufacturing process.
The cracks in the IPyC were observed not to propagate directly into the SiC, although, whenever
a radial crack was observed in the SiC, it was located near a crack in the IPyC. A planar view of 
a spherical object could also explain why the cracks do not seem to align. Contact between the 
IPyC and SiC layers was maintained except in the neighborhood of the IPyC cracks, where 
irradiation shrinkage appeared to have caused the IPyC to pull away from the SiC toward the 
particle’s center.  These features are shown in the particle cross section in Figure 5-4.
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The only though-wall cracks in the SiC were observed to be radial in orientation, as shown in 
Figure 5-4.  Some short circumferential cracks were observed on the inside surface of the SiC that 
did not penetrate a great distance into the layer, as illustrated in the cross section in Figure 5-5. 
Much longer circumferential cracks were observed in one low exposure compact cross section as 
shown in Figure 5-6. It is suspected that these cracks may have been induced by grinding and 
polishing during metallographic preparation of the compact cross section, as this type of cracking 
was not observed in compacts at higher irradiation exposures.  In general, it is thought that cracks 
were not induced into the brittle SiC layer during metallographic mount preparation, as evidenced 
by stable crack patterns observed in successive grindings of the same mount and the absence of
new cracks developing in successive grindings. Occasionally, evidence of porosity in the SiC 
was found, as illustrated in Figure 5-7.  Such porosity was sometimes observed in the 
metallographic examination of particles that had been identified by IMGA to have lost cesium,
but the principal characteristic that separated cesium-releasing particles from cesium–retaining
particles was through-wall radial cracks in the SiC layer.  Figure 5-8 shows an example of 
lenticular inclusion (gold spot) occasionally observed in the SiC, but not associated with failure 
of the coating.  Asphericity of particles was not observed to be associated with SiC failure, as 
many of the failures were in nearly spherical particles, and strongly aspherical particles generally 
did not fail. 
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Figure 5-2. Irradiation-induced shrinkage of buffer caused a gap between the IPyC and buffer.
Fission gas bubbles in the kernel indicate kernel swelling took place. (3.7 x 1025 n/m2, 79%FIMA, 
746ºC).
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Figure 5-3.  Kernel swelling through a radial crack in the buffer was effectively retained by
IPyC. (3.7 x 1025 n/m2, 79%FIMA, 987ºC ). 
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Figure 5-4.  Radial cracks in the SiC were usually near a crack in the IPyC.  The IPyC was 
generally in contact with the SiC except at the location of the crack in the IPyC. (3.7 x 1025 n/m2,
79%FIMA, 746ºC).
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Figure 5-5.  Small circumferential cracks on the inside surface of the SiC layer. (3.7 x 1025 n/m2,
79%FIMA, 746ºC.)
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Figure 5-6. Large circumferential cracks in SiC.  (2.3 x 1025 n/m2, 73%FIMA, 845ºC.)
59
Figure 5-7.  Porosity in SiC.  (3.7 x 1025 n/m2, 79%FIMA, 806ºC.)
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Figure 5-8. Lenticular flaws (gold spots) in SiC.  (3.7 x 1025 n/m2, 79%FIMA, 987ºC.)
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Coating layer failure statistics gathered from metallographic examinations of compact cross
sections are presented in Table 5-3 as a function of neutron fast fluence.  These data indicate that 
PPyC failures are uniformly very high (85 to 100%) at fluences above 1.9 x 1025 n/m2.  Over this 
same range of fluence, OPyC failures were 47 to 90%, IPyC failures were 9 to 65%, and SiC 
failures were 0 to 3%.  The much higher failure rates of the PyC layers, compared with SiC, 
suggest that the occurrence of failed SiC without failed IPyC or OPyC is unlikely (in fact, none
were observed in metallography) and that measurements of the fraction of particles with exposed 
kernels and the fraction of particles with failed SiC should be nearly identical (in agreement with
results in Table 5-2). 
Table 5-3. Coating layer failures measured by metallography of compact cross sections.
Compact/
segment
Fast fluence 
(1025 n/m2)
PPyC failure 
(%)
OPyC failure
(%)
IPyC failure
(%)
SiC failure 
(%)
NPR-1  A8/1 
NPR-1  A8/2 
NPR-1  A5 
NPR-2  A4 
NPR-1A  9 
2.3
1.8
3.7
3.7
1.9
85
16
100
92
100
71
5
90
67
47
9
0
30
65
18
0
0
1
3
1
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5.6 Fission Product Distribution 
Scanning electron microscopy was a useful, but time consuming tool for the investigation of the
distribution of fission product elements throughout the irradiated fuel particle, including fission
product chemical attack of SiC.  Consequently, this technique was only applied to a few carefully
selected particles. 
The distribution of fission products through particle coating layers was measured by scanning 
electron microscope using energy dispersive and wavelength-despersive spectroscopy.  Four
individual fuel particles from high exposure (fast fluence of 3.7 x 1025 n/m2) compacts from
capsule NPR-1 were examined.  Two of the particles had been determined by IMGA to be 
retentive of cesium and two were determined to be non-retentive. The particles were individually
mounted and ground to remove most or all of the kernel, thereby reducing the radioactivity and 
allowing examination on an unshielded electron microscope.
Cesium, cerium, and barium were found outside the kernel in the buffer and IPyC in retentive 
particles, and perhaps, at a low level in the SiC of non-retentive particles.  Although the majority
of the cerium and barium remains in the kernel, the migration of these materials into the IPyC has
been observed previously (Minato et al., 1994).  Figure 5-9 shows the distribution of cesium,
cerium, and barium in a non-retentive particle in which a small portion of the kernel remains.
Palladium was occasionally observed to concentrate at the IPyC/ SiC interface, as is shown in a
cross section of a retentive particle in Figure 5-10.  In no case were fission products found to 
concentrate at defects in the SiC, such as at gold spots or cracks.
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d.c.
Figure 5-9. a. Secondary electron image of a non retentive particle containing a portion of the
fuel kernel (3.7 x 1025 n/m2, 79%FIMA, 987°C). b.  Cesium distribution in the kernel, buffer, 
IPyC, and SiC. c. Cerium distribution in the kernel, buffer, IPyC, and SiC. d. Barium distribution 
in the kernel, buffer, IPyC, and SiC. 
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Figure 5-10. a.  Secondary electron image of a retentive particle without kernel and buffer (3.7 
x 1025 n/m2, 79%FIMA, 987°C). b.  Palladium accumulation at the IPyC/ SiC interface
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6. MOST PROBABLE CAUSES OF FUEL PARTICLE FAILURE
Evidence from as-manufactured characterization, irradiation, and postirradiation examination data 
indicates that irradiation-induced changes in material properties of the pyrocarbons played a 
dominant role in the failure of fuel particles to retain fission gases.  First, the as-manufactured
particle characterization data indicate that the level of as-manufactured defects in the SiC prior to 
irradiation (4 x 10–4) was two orders of magnitude too low to account for the level of particle 
failures  (up to 4 x 10-2 in high fluence compacts) inferred from in-reactor fission gas release and
measured in the postirradiation examination. Introduction of percent level SiC defects during 
compact fabrication was unlikely, based on burn leach tests that detected only 3 x 10-6 fraction at 
the compact stage and 2 x 10-3 fraction measured postirradiation by IMGA in moderate fluence 
compacts.  Second, the particle failures were a strong function of neutron fast fluence, as 
evidenced by the increase in in-reactor fission gas release with irradiation time. Third, IMGA 
data indicates cesium release from fuel particles was a function of both fast neutron fluence and 
irradiation temperature. Fourth, fission gas release data from postirradiation TRIGA testing 
indicate fuel particle failure strongly depended on fast neutron fluence and less strongly depended 
on irradiation temperature.
These observations are in accordance with the well-known behavior of pyrocarbons, i.e., 
pyrocarbons undergo dimensional changes with fast neutron fluence, sometimes leading to failure
of coating layers, depending in starting density and isotropy (Kaae, 1975).  In contrast, SiC is 
relatively stable under neutron irradiation (Price, 1977).  The experimental evidence strongly 
implicates irradiation-induced changes in the pyrocarbon layers as having played a leading role in 
the NP-MHTGR fuel particle failures. Direct observation by metallography in the PIE confirmed
the large-scale failure of pyrocarbon layers and the fluence dependence of these failures.
The PPyC is expected to shrink and fail early under irradiation and widespread PPyC failure (85
to 100% above a fluence of 1.9 x 1025 n/m2) was measured by metallography.  The OPyC is also 
expected to shrink under irradiation, but the extent of OPyC failure observed above 1.9 x 1025
n/m2 (47-90%) was unexpected and is mostly likely attributable to crack propagation from the 
PPyC.  The inner seal coat between the PPyC and the OPyC was expected to separate the two
layers and prevent crack propagation. However, the seal coat acted as a strong bond and 
facilitated crack propagation. 
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The IPyC layer was thicker, denser, and more anisotropic than the OPyC layer and was 
constrained on its outer dimension by the SiC.  These factors led to a calculation of 40% 
probability of IPyC failure at high fluence.  IPyC failure was widespread (18 to 65%) at fluences 
above 1.9 x 1025 n/m2, but was less extensive than OPyC failure. IPyC failure was most likely a 
result of irradiation-induced shrinkage. 
The irradiation-induced failures of the pyrocarbon layers suggest three possible SiC failure 
mechanisms for which evidence was found in the NP-MHTGR fuel irradiations. Two of these 
mechanisms are mechanical in nature and one is chemical/ mechanical.  It must be acknowledged 
that the limited postirradiation examinations conducted on the NP-MHTGR fuel cannot eliminate
the possibility that other, as yet identified, failure mechanisms could exist. 
The most probable of the causes identified was mechanical failure of the SiC induced by the 
concentration of tensile stresses in the SiC in the vicinity of cracks in the IPyC, where an IPyC 
layer was apparently strongly bonded to the SiC.  In compact metallography IPyC failures were
observed without SiC failures, but all through-wall cracks in the SiC were found to be in the 
vicinity of the IPyC cracks.  Metallographic evidence could not determine the strength of the 
bond between the IPyC and the SiC, but only that contact existed.  However, in crush strength 
tests on unirradiated fuel particles, it was observed that the IPyC layer (but not the OPyC layer)
remained attached to the SiC layer after the particles had been broken. 
Preliminary analyses show that large concentrations of tensile stresses are possible in the SiC 
adjacent to cracks in an IPyC layer, which is strongly bonded to the SiC layer. The analyses
indicate that, because of the singularity at the crack tip, the magnitudes of the stresses and the 
failure probability calculated depend on the fineness of the finite element mesh.  This preliminary
evaluation concluded that fracture analysis is required to quantify the stresses around the crack tip 
and to assess the potential for crack propagation through the SiC coating. However, the 
preliminary analysis also indicates that the probability of SiC failure by this mechanism was five 
times greater when the OPyC had failed than when it was intact. 
In addition to the most probable cause identified above, there are two additional mechanisms that
could have contributed to the fuel particle failures found in the NP-MHTGR irradiations, one
mechanical and one chemical/ mechanical. Crush-strength measurements of unirradiated NP-
MHTGR fuel particles (obtained from the burning of compacts) have produced some evidence of
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a population of weak SiC layers.  Analyses indicate that the weak particles, making up the tail
(~1%) of the distribution of particle strengths, could fail from fission product over pressure, given 
failure of both the OPyC and IPyC layers.  However, no observed examples of multiple fracturing 
of SiC suggest that SiC bursting caused by over pressure was probably not a major failure 
mechanism in these irradiations.
The third mechanism was primarily chemical but also required the irradiation-induced failure of 
the IPyC layer.  Some evidence of porosity in the SiC layer was observed in the postirradiation 
metallography of NP-MHTGR particles determined by IMGA to be deficient in cesium.
Analyses indicate that CO produced at high burnups (>75%FIMA) in kernels whose initial 
composition was below the desired 15 mole percent of UC2 could cause corrosion of SiC. This 
mechanism was limited by the fraction of particles having UC2 contents less than 15% (measured
to be 1.5%) that were also at high burnup and had fractured IPyC. Corrosion of SiC by CO has
been found to exhibit strong local grain boundary attack and pitting of the SiC (Minato et al, 
1991) rather than the minor porosity observed in the metallography of the NP-MHTGR fuel. 
These differences cast doubt on the likelihood of the CO corrosion mechanism as a contributor to 
SiC failure in the NP-MHTGR irradiations. 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MHTGR FUEL
DEVELOPMENT
The NP-MHTGR program demonstrates that fuel can be designed and fabricated to meet
requirements for as-manufactured fuel quality that are much more stringent than those required of 
past HTGR fuel used successfully in U.S. reactors (300 times more stringent than the 
requirements for Fort St. Vrain fuel, despite there being a containment in the NP-MHTGR 
design). However, the design changes intended to meet these new as-manufactured quality
requirements did not change fuel particle integrity under irradiation.  The NP-MHTGR fuel, as 
tested, was capable of meeting all safety requirements for normal operations.  Nonetheless, the
goals of a passively safe and very clean NP-MHTGR led the program to pursue better fuel 
performance.  The authors recommend further development in the following areas. 
Future MHTGR fuel development should first set requirements for as-manufactured fuel quality
and in-service fuel integrity under normal and accident conditions that meet safety requirements
with reasonable margin, taking into account all the applicable safety features of the reactor design 
in addition to the fuel itself.  Then, the development program should focus on designing,
fabricating, and demonstrating the performance of fuel that maintains its required integrity during 
irradiation, while meeting acceptable as-manufactured quality requirements.  For example, use of 
a containment should enable the relaxation of some of the requirements for as-manufactured fuel 
quality and in-service fuel performance, keeping in mind, however, requirements for
maintainability and exposure to reactor personnel. 
Measurement of the microstructural, impurity, and strength characteristics of SiC coatings in PTF 
and German fuel in the NP-MHTGR program revealed no difference that should lead to vastly
different integrity of this layer under irradiation.  It appears, therefore, that the SiC layer
fabricated in the NP-MHTGR program was, in itself, capable of maintaining adequate integrity 
under irradiation.  Decreasing the grain size of the SiC to be closer to that in the German SiC may
be marginally beneficial in terms of reducing fission product diffusive release and improving
strength.  However, the principal recommendation is that future MHTGR fuel development 
programs should concentrate on other aspects of the fuel particle design to seek improved particle 
integrity under irradiation. 
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The principal fuel particle failure mechanism, identified by the postirradiation examination of 
compacts irradiated in the NP-MHTGR program and subsequent stress analysis of the layers, was 
the cracking of SiC, induced by shrinkage cracks in the IPyC, the OPyC having to a large extent, 
failed earlier.  The failure of the OPyC was caused by crack propagation from the PPyC through
its inner seal coat.  Future MHTGR fuel development programs should eliminate the PPyC and its 
seal coats.  The PPyC was a new feature of the NP-MHTGR fuel designed to reduce SiC 
breakage during compacting. This design change was successful in improving as-manufactured
fuel quality, but caused increased OPyC failure under irradiation.  The inner seal coat was 
supposed to prevent crack propagation from the PPyC to the OPyC, but it did not perform this 
function.  Future MHTGR fuel development programs will need to improve compacting
conditions such as matrix chemistry and impurity control, as well as injection pressure and curing 
requirements to minimize particle damage during compacting.
The IPyC failed from excessive irradiation-induced shrinkage, probably caused by a higher 
degree of anisotropy, (associated with reduced permeability) and greater thickness designed to 
reduce uranium chemical reaction with corrosive gases during SiC coating.  Again, the design 
change performed its function of improving as-manufactured fuel quality, but led to enhanced 
coating layer failure under irradiation.  Stress analysis indicates that both the thicker IPyC and 
early OPyC failure increase the likelihood of SiC failure upon failure of the IPyC, which was well 
bonded to the SiC.  Future MHTGR fuel development should return to the customary 35µm IPyC
layer thickness used historically in the United States and Germany from the 50µm thickness used 
in the NP-MHTGR design.  Additionally, future development in this area should seek to improve
the isotropy of this layer, and also that of the OPyC layer to reduce the probability of failure of
these layers under irradiation.  Future programs will need to consider other means, such as 
reduced SiC coating temperature, to minimize reaction with uranium during SiC coating. Future
fuel development programs should review the benefits and detriments associated with a strong 
bond between the IPyC and the SiC.  It may not be easy to avoid strong bonding, and an 
experimental study in the Dragon Program (Voice, 1974) recommends strong bonding between 
these layers.
It appears that future MHTGR fuel development programs would benefit by considering the 
performance of the entire system of coating layers in the TRISO design with respect to particle 
integrity under irradiation. Stress analysis indicates that intact PyC layers provide a significant 
benefit to SiC integrity by maintaining compressive stresses on both the ID and OD surfaces of
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the SiC.  It is necessary for the IPyC to be bonded to the SiC to provide compressive stress on the 
inner surface of the SiC.  However, it is not necessary for the OPyC to be bonded to the SiC to 
maintain the SiC in compression.  It is likely that more attention to the properties of PyC layers to 
resist failure by irradiation-induced shrinkage would result in improved fuel irradiation
performance relative to that achieved in the NP-MHTGR program.
We recommend that mechanistic modeling studies be performed early in the re-design of the fuel 
particle to explore design alternatives, better understand fission product transport, and add 
confidence that the fuel will perform as required.  It is likely that improvements to models of 
coating layer performance, including the mechanical properties of PyC layers as a function of
fluence and irradiation temperature, will be required. 
Whatever the design changes that may be investigated by future programs, we recommend, based 
on the exploratory process development portion of the NP-MHTGR program, that a statistically
designed exploratory process improvement program be implemented to ensure the achievement
of optimum coating conditions leading to the desired coating characteristics and reproducible 
results.  SiC characterization, perhaps based on the methylene iodide work done by the NP-
MHTGR program, needs to be expanded so that fabrication process problems can be identified
and coupled with irradiation performance.
Results from attempts to improve the methods for the measurement of SiC defects in as-
manufactured fuel were not successful in the NP-MHTGR program.  Furthermore, none of the
methods was capable of predicting in-reactor particle failure.  Future MHTGR fuel development
programs should reconsider what properties of the fuel particles and compacts should be 
characterized by quality assurance measurements and whether the results of such measurements
can reasonably be expected to predict in-reactor performance. 
Design alternatives should be tested under irradiation, employing adequate postirradiation
examination to identify early on the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to fuel 
improvement, and to develop an understanding of the relationship between the measurable
characteristics of the as-manufactured fuel and the irradiation behavior.  Future irradiation 
capsules need to be based on statistical validation of performance models, at the least a factorial
design to fully cover core conditions. 
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A number of lessons were learned about the effectiveness of various techniques for examining
irradiated MHTGR fuel during the postirradiation examination conducted under the NP-MHTGR 
program.  It was discovered that TRIGA fission gas release measurements were a good indicator
of the relative failure fraction of particles (bare kernels) from compact to compact within an 
irradiation capsule.  The technique, however, produced absolute values that were high by a factor 
of 4 to 80, relative to measurements of particle failure fraction from in-reactor fission gas release
(both gamma spikes and noble gas R/B), irradiated microsphere gamma analysis (IMGA), leach-
burn-leach, and compact metallography.  IMGA provided results on SiC failure fraction in 
reasonable agreement with results from optical metallography and leach-burn-leach.  Optical 
metallography of compacts requires skillful and painstaking sample preparation and photo 
microscopy, but was essential in determining failure modes of particle coating layers.  Scanning 
electron microscopy using energy dispersive spectrometry and wave length spectrometry is a 
useful tool for examining a limited number of fuel particle cross sections, especially failed 
particles, for evidence of fission product migration within coating layers and fission product or
chemical attack on SiC. 
There is a need to develop efficient techniques for postirradiation measurements of the fraction of 
exposed kernels and particles with failed SiC.  Gas release measurements by reactivating short 
lived fission gases at elevated temperature (performed in a King furnace in a TRIGA reactor) is a 
sensitive and reasonably cost effective technique, but the absolute magnitude of the results are 
uncertain and the availability of reactor facilities capable of this measurement in the future is 
uncertain.  Both the absolute magnitude of the results and the availability of a facility for 
activation of short-lived fission gases must be addressed if this technique is to be used in the 
future.  IMGA provides a good measure of the fraction of particles with failed SiC, but the 
technique is relatively slow and expensive. The leach-burn-leach technique shows promise for the 
measurement of both exposed kernels and failed SiC, but concerns about sensitivity of the 
technique (especially as fuel performance improves) and corrosion of SiC need to be addressed
by future development.
Finally, core fuel management studies that reduce peak-to-average values for burnup, fluence,
and temperature should be pursued.  Preliminary studies indicate that a 100º C decrease in peak 
fuel temperature, and a 20% decrease in peak fluences are achievable without affecting core 
economics and average burnup. Further work in this area, coupled with a greater understanding of 
the fuel performance drivers, should reveal considerable performance margins.
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